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Introduction 
 
On May 28, 2008, the newly-elected constituent assembly declared Nepal a federal 
republic, thus putting an end to the long and troubled journey undertaken since the 1950s to 
bring democracy to the country (Hachhethu et al 131). In fact, for the last seven decades, the 
political history of Nepal saw a continuous struggle between royal and democratic forces 
attempting to take and maintain power in the state, resulting in a long period of political 
instability, civil turmoil, and economic hardship (132-133). By adopting modes of transition 
theory to analyze the democratic history of Nepal, three main non-consecutive phases can be 
identified as crucial to the gradual establishment of democracy in the Himalayan state 
(Kantha 59). The first one, starting in 1951 with the demise of the Rana’s autocracy, and 
ending in 1960 with the coup staged by King Mahendra, saw the first multiparty parliament 
being installed in the country, and brought about the first general elections and the creation of 
a constituent assembly for the drawing of a new constitution (62). The second one, occurring 
in the years 1990-1991, saw the abolition of the thirty-year-long Panchayat regime 
established after the royal coup of 1960, and entailed the restoration of the multi-party 
parliament together with the formation of a new constituent assembly (64-65). The third, and 
final, one, initiated in 2005, was the outcome of a joint effort made by the seven political 
parties and the Maoist insurgents to finally overthrow monarchic rule in the country, and 
culminated with the proclamation of the Republic in 2008 (66). 
Indeed, from the point of view of democracy studies, the political history of Nepal presents a 
very interesting case study, and has therefore been analyzed thoroughly. In democratization 
theory, the successful democratization of a given country is understood as the result of a 
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combination of internal and external factors (Huntington 92). One of the external factors 
identified as crucial for democratic transitions worldwide is what Samuel Huntington labelled 
“neighborhood effect”, a theory inferring that a country is more likely to become democratic 
if its neighbors are-or become- democracies (93-94).  
Indeed, in the context of Nepal, given its landlocked position and its geographical proximity 
to India, the biggest republic in the world, the neighborhood effect has been quintessential. In 
fact, in spite of not possessing a clear democracy promotion agenda, the Republic of India 
has constantly intervened, both openly and covertly, in the democratization of Nepal, in the 
attempt to establish there a solid form of government which would favour its interests in the 
domestic as well as international arena (Destradi 286-287). India’s interference in Nepal’s 
domestic affairs should not come as a surprise, considering the relevant position that the 
Himalayan state has always occupied in New Delhi’s foreign policy. In fact, because Nepal 
not only shares a long and open border with India, but also abuts on China, it has always been 
of critical importance for India’s strategy to extend its hegemony over South Asia (Destradi 
291-293). 
Scholars worldwide have interpreted India’s influence in Nepal’s democratization process by 
endorsing different theories adopted to understand states behavior in international relations, 
thus providing insights of the bilateral relationship between the two countries through liberal, 
realist, and constructivist interpretations (Bansh Jha 44; Dhakal 133; Destradi 289; 
Mazumdar et al 79). Indeed, the literature covering this subject  provides a clear and 
comprehensive picture of the “India Factor” in Nepal. However, what has been so far 
missing, is an analysis of how the democratization process of Nepal has been fostered by 
India through the use of language. In other words, no author has focused yet on how India has 
presented democracy through a discourse, aimed at concealing New Delhi’s interests in a 
democratic Nepal. As it will be argued in this paper, a post-structural approach to 
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international relations can contribute to fill in this gap. Postructuralism is a school of thought 
that emerged between the 1960s and 1970s from the notions and theories formulated by De 
Saussure, Derrida, and Foucault, and focuses on uncovering relationships of power embedded 
in the use of language (Easthope 14). Under this light, democracy can be studied as a 
discourse, a text whose real meaning can be found in the intentions hiding behind the 
strategic adoption of language (Newman 141-142). The strength of post-structuralism in 
international relations theory does not lie only in its ability of challenging master narratives 
and uncovering relationships of power between two nations, but also in its capability to look 
into the context shaping the discourse, thus being able to trace its evolution (De Goede 60). 
Consequently, following a post-structural approach, the purpose of this thesis is to pinpoint 
and study the evolution of the democracy discourse adopted by India over Nepal’s political 
developments, in order to show how such discourse changed over time to reflect India’s 
different approaches to its foreign policy as well as its changing interests in a democratic 
Nepal.  
The relevance of such a topic lies on two main tenets. Firstly, on the fact that Indo-Nepal 
relationship is a hot and trending topic today, especially since the adoption of the newly-
drawn constitution of 2015 (Saati 30). Secondly, on the promise of a major contribution to 
the already-existing analysis of India’s impact on the democratization of Nepal, and of its 
hegemonic role in South Asia. In fact, a thorough analysis of the discursive practices adopted 
by the Indian government in the context of Nepal would provide a poststructural perspective 
on the issue at hand, and would do so by uncovering hidden relationships of power between 
the two countries through the study of language. 
 This thesis will be structured as follows: 
Chapter I will adopt modes of transition theory to provide a succinct history of the 
democratization of Nepal and of the role played by India in its unfolding, with the purpose to 
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identify the three main transitional phases of the Himalayan state. Chapter II will be 
dedicated to an analysis of the existing literature covering the bilateral relationship between 
India and Nepal over the democratization of the latter, and will pinpoint its contributions as 
well as find the gap that will be analyzed in the paper. Chapter III will lay the foundations of 
the theories necessary for a good understanding of this paper, thus elaborating on post-
structuralism, the democracy discourse, and the contributions that these theories can bring to 
the study of international relations. Chapter IV will revolve around an explanation of the 
methodology adopted throughout the paper, and will explain what political discourse analysis 
consist of, and the series of sources that it will analyze. The following three chapters will 
analyse the democratic discourse adopted by India to enhance democratization in Nepal, thus 
being divided on the basis of the period taken into consideration and the approach to foreign 
policy endorsed by New Delhi in that period. Chapter V will study the discourse during the 
first transitional phase of Nepal (1951-1959), and will see how it reflects India’s foreign 
policy under the leadership of Nehru. Chapter VI will study the discourse in the year 1990-
1991, and will examine it vis-a-vis India’s structural approach to foreign policy embraced 
between 1962 and 1991. Chapter VII will look at the democracy discourse in post-
liberalization India during the last transitional phase of Nepal, the one spanning from 2005 to 
2008. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the findings of this paper, and will point out its 
strengths as well as its shortcomings.  
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Chapter I. Historical Background 
 
The democratic history of Nepal traces its origins back to the end of the Rana regime 
in 1950, and culminates in 2008, with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Nepal 
(Hachhethu et al 131). Nepal’s path to democracy has been a troubled one, with royal forces 
and internal conflicts hindering the smooth transition process in several points in time. India, 
as the hegemonic power in South Asia, has played a crucial role in the democratic transition 
of the Himalayan state, often disregarding ideas of national sovereignty and intervening , 
either openly or covertly, in the affairs of its neighbour (Bansh Jha 43).  If one analyses the 
democratic process of Nepal in terms of modes of transition theory, three non-consecutive 
main phases can be pinpointed as decisive to the gradual achievement of democratic rule in 
the country: the first one covering the decade from 1951 to 1959; the second one spanning 
through the years  1990-1991, and the last one starting in 2005 and ending in 2008 with the 
abolition of the  monarchic system (Kantha 59). The narrative explaining Nepal’s political 
history in terms of modes of transition theory is arguably the most suited to illustrate the 
continuous alternation between democracy and monarchy in the Himalayan state, as it not 
only captures the volatility of the Nepali political system, but also helps uncovering the major 
factors and actors that have contributed to these transitions.  
Therefore, after providing a short explanation of modes of transition theory, this section aims 
at presenting  a succinct history of democracy in Nepal , looking both at the three major 
transitional phases as well as at events and contexts shaping them, while simultaneously 
analysing India’s influence in the process.  
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Modes of transition theory has been formulated in the 1970s to obviate the issues that 
emerged in the empirical analyses of democratic transitions worldwide. According to the 
supporters of this theory, its application allows for an understanding of democracy based on 
“minimal procedures rather than substantive outcomes” (Linz et al 33). By following this 
theory, scholars can drift away from previously-adopted approaches that search for 
prerequisites of democratic installation, and focus on the “strategic choices and sequential 
patterns” that bring about the gradual attainment of democracy (Kantha 60). In so doing, 
modes of transition theory emphasizes the role played by political actors and contributes to 
the formulation of several analytical models, distinguishable amongst them on the basis  of 
the actors, the strategies, and the different forms of democracies they bring about (Linz et al 
37-38). In the context of Nepal, such theory allows for the identification of three models, 
namely ‘reforms through transaction’, ‘reforms through extrication’, and ‘reforms through 
rupture’, which vary based on the role played by the local elites as well as by external actors, 
and together bring about a concise explanation of democracy in Nepal as the result of gradual 
transformation (Kantha 61-65). 
The first democratic transition took place in the period spanning from 1951 to 1959, and saw 
Nepal gradually transforming from an autocratic feudal state to a constitutional monarchy 
(Kantha 62). In this phase, the main proponents of change were the Nepali Congress and the 
Indian government. In 1950, the NC took advantage of the popular discontent created by the 
Ranas since their ascendance to power in 1846, and gathered strength to start a military 
rebellion that culminated with the anti-Rana forces seizing control of most of the territories 
constituting eastern Nepal (Hacchethu et al 132). Indeed, whilst the NC was crucial in 
pressuring the Ranas to leave power, the most significant action bringing about the 
democratic transition in this phase was undertaken by India. In fact, following King 
Tribhuvan’s decision to escape to New Delhi in 1950, PM Nehru called for a diplomatic 
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meeting that would decide on the fate of Nepali politics, and that was joined by the Rana 
rulers, the NC, and the King, whilst being mediated by the Indian Prime Minister himself 
(Destradi 294). The decisions made in the diplomatic summit were summarized in the ‘Delhi 
Agreement’, signed by all the competing forces at the end of 1950. The accord set the 
foundations for a political system of governing  that, as stipulated by the Interim Government 
of Nepal Act of 1951, was labelled ‘King in Parliament’, and envisaged the return of King 
Tribhuvan to the throne, the formation of a coalition government presided by the members of 
the NC and of the Rana dynasty, and the creation of a constituent assembly for the writing of 
a new democratic constitution (295-296). Therefore, the Delhi Agreement paved the way for 
the beginning of the 8-year-long first democratic transition of Nepal, a transition referred to 
as ‘reforms through transaction’ (Kantha 60). In modes of transition theory, this model entails 
a prolonged period of power-shifting where the opposition becomes more influential, while 
simultaneously still leaving some lingering power in the hands of the elite, who can still 
shape the political arena of the country and implement rules and reforms which are not 
optimal for the achievement of democracy (60-61). In fact, if, on the one hand, this first 
transition brought about the establishment of several democratic features, such as a multi-
party system, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and periodic free elections; on the 
other hand, it gave, through a series of special provisions inserted in the constitution, 
substantial power to the King, who could claim power in alleged states of emergency 
(Hachhethu et al 132-133). It was particularly the presence of the King and his supporters in 
parliament which hindered the smooth democratic process of Nepal in this phase. In fact, the 
royal forces caused the general elections to be continuously postponed, and brought about 
political instability concretized in 10 different appointed governments ruling the country in 8 
years (133). Furthermore, the special provisions giving power to the King were the final 
straw which put an end to the first democratic transition of Nepal ( Kantha 63). When, in 
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1959, the NC won the first general elections and formed a new government under B.P. 
Koirala, this only lasted a few week, as  King Mahendra declared the state of emergency, and, 
in 1960, staged a coup which dismantled the parliament and established absolute monarchy 
(135-136). The royal coup marked the end of the first democratic transition of Nepal, and 
caused the democratic progression of the country to come to a halt for the next 30 years 
(Destradi 289). 
The second democratic transition was of shorter length, and occurred between the years 
1990-1991. In the interlude to this transition, Nepal saw the royal power consolidating, as the 
new constitution of 1962 set the foundations for the establishment of the Panchayat system, a 
system of governing which was defined as a “guided partyless democracy” (Kadhka 429). In 
fact, the alleged emergency of 1960 gave the King the pretext to abolish the parties and 
increase its influence in the political arena, as it was argued that the parties presented a threat 
to the independence of Nepal, and that the King only was able to guarantee stability in the 
country (Hachhetu et al 134-135). By 1990, a series of factors had stirred discontent amongst 
the Nepali population, thus eroding the legitimacy of the Panchayat regime and paving the 
way for the second transition. In fact, not only had the despotic regime of the King failed to 
cater to the needs of its population, but it also enraged India which, following King 
Birendra’s decision to buy weapons from China, imposed an economic blockade on Nepal 
and worsened its already critical situation (Bansh Jha 45-46). By adopting modes of transition 
theory, three main actors can this time be identified as crucial in bringing about the second 
transition: the political parties of Nepal, the urban class, and, once again, although in a more 
marginal way, the Government of India (Kantha 64). The frustration of the urban class, 
fostered by the intensification of the economic crisis in the late 80s, led to several scattered 
protests emerging – and being repressed by the royal army- throughout the country. The NC, 
this time backed up by the left parties of Nepal unified under the Unified Left Alliance, took 
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advantage of the popular discontent and called for a mass protests for the restoration of 
democracy (“Jan Andolan I”), joined by the urban class and several oppressed ethnic groups, 
which pushed King Birendra to abolish the 30-year-long Panchayat regime, restore the 
Parliament, call for general elections, and grant a new constitution (Hacheethu et al 134-135). 
This transition can be framed in terms of ‘reforms through extrication’, and culminates  with 
the success of the first general elections of 1991 which saw the NC win and form a 
government. (Kantha 63) The  model of ‘reforms through extrication’ entails the opposition 
defeating the elite, and the creation of a more solid form of democracy,  but it also allows for 
some continuity with the old regime, which can undermine the efficiency of the democratic 
system (60-61) The relative strength of the new democratic system imposed through the 
second transition is proved by the fact that two other free and competitive parliament 
elections were held after 1991, one being in 1994 and the other one in 1999,  which saw 
different parties winning and forming a government, hence meaning that Nepal passed what 
in democracy studies is called ‘ the turnover test’1, a “sign of solid democracy”(Hachhethu et 
al 134) The continuity with the old government was provided by the fact that the constitution 
was granted by the King, and it presented a series of provisions, such as article 127, which 
granted special powers to the head of state, making the King head of the Nepali army and 
allowing him to dismiss the parliament in unspecified cases of emergency. (135) Therefore, 
this second transition saw a consolidation of the democratic rule in Nepal, but it still 
presented a series of features which made such democratic establishment non-optimal, and 
brought about its end in 2005, with the occurrence of another royal coup (Kantha 65). India’s 
role in this phase, although still fundamental, was more marginal if compared to its 
intervention in the first transition. The marginality of India in this period has to be understood 
by looking at its foreign policy approach towards Nepal in the period spanning through the 
                                               
1 The two turnover test is a form of measurement adopted in political science to evaluate the stability 
of a democratic system. A country passes such test when, in general elections, the opposition wins, 
and the old government hands in power peacefully.  
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1960s-1990s (Bansh Jha 45-46). In fact, because at this time the Government of India was 
concerned with the threat that China presented to its northeastern frontier, and was worried 
about Nepal’s closer ties with the communist Republic, New Delhi adopted an approach 
towards Nepal labelled ‘Twin Pillar Policy’, which saw the country limiting its tampering in 
the domestic affairs of the Himalayan state, and in New Delhi supporting simultaneously both 
the democratic forces and the King, in the hope that such refrain from intervention would 
cause Nepal to drift away from China (Dhabade et al 166). 
The third democratic transition initiated in 2005, after King Gyanedra took power to contain 
the Maoist insurgency afflicting Nepal since 1996, and culminated in 2008, with the signing 
of the peace deal that put an end to the civil war, and the proclamation of the Republic 
(Kantha 66-67). This transition saw the participation of a wider range of actors, as the Seven 
Party Alliance, the Maoist insurgents, India, and the rural section of the population all took 
part in the political process putting an end to the rule of the Shah dynasty in Nepal (67). Such 
final changeover can be interpreted in terms of ‘reforms through rupture’, which envisages a 
radical shift of power from the elite to the opposition, a smooth and quick democratic 
progression, and the establishment of a sound democratic system which has strong roots (60-
61). In 1996, the civil war between the state and the Maoist insurgents broke out, as the latter, 
dissatisfied with the scarce impact that the new democratic establishment had on social 
equality, attempted to proclaim a People’s Republic in the country (Hachhethu et al 137). To 
face the Maoist threat, King Gyaendra assumed power according to the special provisions 
granted by the constitution, and once again put a halt to the democratic advancements 
achieved in the previous decade (138). In this phase, Nepal was afflicted by social and 
political chaos, and the different factions (the Maoists, the King, and the parties) struggled to 
find a compromise that would promote peace in the country.  It was only in 2005, when 
India’s diplomatic intervention contributed to finding an agreement between the Maoists and 
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the seven parties, that the two factions joined forces against the despotic rule of the King 
(Bansh Jha 46). The result of India’s mediation was the ‘12-Point Agreement’, which 
stipulated peace and cooperation and envisaged the entrance of the Maoists in the political 
arena of Nepal under the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M) (47). The cooperation between 
the two competing forces set the foundations for the second movement of restoration of 
democracy (‘Jan Andolan II’) that, joined by the rural population, pushed King Gyanendra to 
leave power and put end to monarchy forever (Hachhethu 138). From 2006 onwards, the 
history of Nepal saw a quick process of transition and consolidation of democracy, and the 
signing of the peace deal, together with the call for new elections which proclaimed the CPN-
M victorious, concluded this transition (138-139). The rupture from the old regime was quite 
evident, not only did Nepal become a republic, but it also underwent a secularization process 
that erased all traces of the old kingdom (139-140).  Indeed, although the democratic 
transition ran smoother and faster than in the past, it was concretized only in 2015, with the 
new constitution officially coming into effect, and proclaiming Nepal a federal secular 
Republic (Muni 16).  
To conclude, this section has provided a short history of the democratic history of Nepal, 
focusing mostly on internal changes as well as the role played by India in supporting them. 
The first transition (1951-1959) saw India direct intervention in the democratization of its 
neighbor, and its participation was concretized in the stipulation of the ‘Delhi Agreement’, 
which put an end to the Rana regime and set the foundations for the establishment of 
democracy. In the second transition (1990-1991), the main proponents of change were the 
NC and the United Left Alliance, which together cooperated to bring down the Panchayat 
system. In this phase, India’s role was more marginal, and was limited to the imposition of an 
economic blockade, perceived as a security measure against the political manoeuvres of the 
King. Finally, in the last transition (2005-2008), through the stipulation of the ’12-Point 
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Agreement’and the peace deal, India paved the way for the cooperation between the Maoist 
insurgents and the Seven Party Alliance, resulting in their joint effort to bring down 
monarchy in the Himalayan state forever.  
The next section will look into how the gradual democratization of Nepal has been analyzed 
in the existing literature, and will provide a more critical perspective on the role played by 
India in the three transitional phases.  
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Chapter II. Literature Review 
 
The literature covering the democratization process of Nepal can be divided into two 
main strands. The first one focuses on the internal factors fostering the democratic transition 
of the country, and therefore  emphasizes the crucial role played by the local elite and the 
civil society in bringing down the monarchic system (Khan 59; Lawoti 7-18; Parajulee 13-
16). The second strand, instead, turns its attention to the “India Factor”, arguing that India has 
been too influential in the democratic transition of its neighbour to consider Nepal’s political 
developments in an isolated context (Bansh Jha 44). The first group of scholarship, although 
indeed relevant in identifying domestic elements influencing Nepal’s political transition, will 
not be analyzed in this section, as its arguments go beyond the purpose of this paper, which 
will instead concentrate on the second strand.   
The authors covering India’s foreign policy with regard to Nepal have studied the bilateral 
relationship between the two countries on the matter of democratization by embracing 
different theories adopted to understand states behavior in international politics. Amongst the 
theories endorsed, realist and liberal interpretations stand out, while constructivism retains 
minor importance in the academic analysis of the issue at hand. Therefore, this section has a 
double purpose. For one thing, it will analyze the literature examining India’s involvement in 
Nepal’s democratization, associating the authors’ opinions to the three main systemic theories 
of international relations. For the other, it will identify a gap in the general narratives 
covering the role played by India in Nepal’s attainment of democracy, a gap that this thesis 
will attempt to bridge through the following chapters.  
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In the scholarship analyzing India’s impact on the three major phases of democratic transition 
of Nepal, realist perspectives proliferate, whilst liberal ones are limited -mostly- to the first 
transition phase (1951-1959), and constructivist analyses are scarce and sporadic, but 
fundamental inasmuch they contest the democratic ideology as homogenous and static. 
Liberal interpretations, which stress the importance of international cooperation for the 
establishment of peace2,  are mostly provided by Schaffer and Schaffer, Ganguly and Pardesi, 
and Destradi, who demonstrate how India fostered democracy in Nepal with the stated goal 
of enhancing peace in the region and simultaneously facilitating the economic development 
of the republic in its post-independence period. However, as Destradi explains in his article 
published in Democratization, such liberal perspective contributes to framing India’s 
participation in the first democratic transition only, and it is not pertinent in framing its 
foreign policy in the period following the Sino-Indian war.  In India at the Global High 
Table: the Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy, a book illustrating the 
trajectories of India’s foreign policy in South Asia, Schaffer and Schaffer explain how, in the 
1950s, India’s approach to international relations revolves around the principles of non-
alignment and decolonization promotion, and state that India’s intervention in the first 
democratic transition of Nepal can be framed in liberal terms (21). In fact, they argue, that 
India, traumatized by its colonial past, and scared by the evolution of the cold war and its 
threat for national sovereignty, was in this decade mostly concerned with “creating a peaceful 
environment in its backyard”, and, in this context,  a democratic Nepal was seen as conducive 
of such stability in South Asia (24-27). Besides, Destradi adds, “although India did not 
possess a concrete agenda of democracy promotion”, it indeed believed that “democracy 
would entail stability and prosperity both in India and in its periphery” (289).   Ganguly and 
Pardesi corroborate Schaffers’ argument by inferring that in this phase India was focused on 
                                               
2 See Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics”” (1159-1164). 
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its domestic development, and that Nehru just wanted to make sure that,  with the exception 
of Kashmir, no conflict on its territory could hinder India’s supposedly smooth  path to 
development. The ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship’ signed in 1950, Destradi continues, 
demonstrates India’s peaceful intentions in this phase (289-290). Because the treaty 
envisaged an open border with consequent flow of Indian citizens  and goods in Nepal and 
vice versa, Nehru aimed at safeguarding its people through political stability, and also at 
“guaranteeing the maximization of provision of public goods to its domestic audience” (290). 
Under this light , Schaffer and Schaffer argue, one has to understand India’s preference of a 
democratic system over the autocracy of the Ranas (26). In fact, Destradi infers, although the 
Ranas proved to be a reliable ally in the short story of post-independence India - assisting the 
Republic in his war against Pakistan over Kashmir-, their rule did not guarantee neither 
political stability in their neighborhood, as the civil war between democratic forces and Rana 
supporters often reversed on the Indian border, nor protection of basic human rights, as 
citizens freedom was constantly undermined by civil unrest (290-291). Furthermore, Schaffer 
and Schaffer insist, India’s liberal tendencies in the 1950s are demonstrated by its continuous 
appeals to the UN for conflict resolutions, thus validating India’s sincere belief in the 
relevance of international institutions in the global order (Schaffer et al 31). Indeed, if, on the 
one hand,  liberalism is effective in explaining India’s support of a democratic Nepal for the 
creation of a peaceful environment, on the other hand, it seems to credulously assume that 
India did not have any personal interests, as in terms of security issues, in having a 
democratic Nepal in its sphere of influence. It is in the analysis of India’s main interests and 
concerns, that realist explanations of India’s foreign policy towards Nepal take over.  
Realist perspectives3, as the ones provided by Dabhade and Pant, Bansh Jha, and Mazumdar 
and Statz, analyze India’s interests in a democratic Nepal from the point of view of its 
                                               
3 See Waltz, The Theory of International Politics  (66-69) 
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security concerns vis-a-vis China, its internal conflicts, and “its constant desire of extending 
its hegemony all over South Asia” ( Dabhade and Pant 159). Such perspective dominates the 
narratives of India’s influence on democracy in Nepal from the first transition to the 
promulgation of the latest constitution (159-160). Both the ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship’ 
and the ‘Twin Pillar policy’, according to Mazmudar and Statz, can be interpreted in terms of 
India’s wish to have a stable ally in South Asia and to increase its influence in its domestic 
affairs (91). Nayak, in his analysis of the  treaty, believes that such political document should 
be understood in the context of India’s attempt to guarantee an alliance with Nepal which 
would not only guarantee its loyalty in case of war with Pakistan, but which would also allow 
India to directly intervene in  Nepal’s domestic affairs whenever it perceives that its own 
security is threatened (584). Consequently, Nayak continues, the treaty must be seen as a 
continuation of British India’s attempt to limit Nepal’s sovereignty and increase its own 
influence on its political as well as economic arenas (590-591). In addition, Sigdel goes as far 
as stating that the “Treaty sets the foundations for India’s attempt to play in Nepal the same 
role that it plays in Bhutan”, where the Republic is completely in charge of Thimphu foreign 
policy (4-5). The ‘Twin Pillar policy’, Mazumdar and Statz believe, also proves that India 
does not care much about democracy as about its own security. The fact that India decides to 
simultaneously support the monarchy and the democratic forces proves that New Delhi just 
wants to guarantee itself a strategic ally, no matter what form of government is ruling it (93-
94). From a realist point of view, also  India’s marginal role in the second democratic 
transition of Nepal does not have to be understood as an acceptance of Nepal’s sovereignty, 
but rather as “an attempt not to further alienate the King”, which was slowly leaning towards 
China (Destradi 289). When the Maoist insurgency broke out in 1996, India’s realist 
approach to international relations became more evident. In fact, as Baral points out in his 
historical analysis of India-Nepal relationship,  India decided to mediate the conflict not to 
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bring peace in Nepal, but rather because of its fear that the Maoist forces would corroborate 
the Naxalite insurgencies which were already thriving in its Northeastern region (819). 
Finally, as Destradi points out when tracing the evolution of India’s democracy promotion 
agenda in Nepal, in the final democratic transition of its neighbor, India’s democratic 
promotion initiatives share similar features with the one of the United States, and, he 
continues,  this should come as no surprise given India’s rapprochement with America in the 
post-2000 period (294). Therefore, whilst “India promotes democracy in Nepal as an escape 
to political instability and economic hardship”, its real intentions are once more an increase in 
its influence in the domestic affairs of the Himalayan state, and under this light the increased 
development aid to Nepal must be interpreted (294-295).  
Indeed, although realist claims bring forward a more pragmatic interpretation of India’s 
intervention in the democratic transition of Nepal, they are still flawed inasmuch they analyse 
the concepts of  democracy and sovereignty as given and static, thus failing to consider how 
they are shaped by the ever-changing reality of the world and how they are negotiated in the 
international arena (Dassbach 144). Indeed, constructivist4 interpretations of India-Nepal 
relationship contribute, at least in part, to bridge this gap. Anil Sigdel, in his article published 
in the Telegraph Nepal of 2013, examines notions of sovereignty and democracy as socially 
constructed, and argues that these concepts, in the history of India-Nepal relations, have been 
“continuously metamorphosed [...] as they are contingent upon the interaction and practices 
between the two states” (2). Therefore, he goes on, “when studying these concepts one has to 
analyze how they reflect the reality in which they have been constructed” (3). In this context, 
he interprets the Treaty of Peace and Friendship as a political document embodying the 
mutual negotiations of the two countries’ sovereignty (4). Suresh Dhakal contributes to the 
constructivist argument by claiming that democracy cannot be analyzed as a homogenous 
                                               
4 See Ravenhill, “Constructivism and International Relations” (66-68) 
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concept in Nepal, as it is “conceptualized and practiced differently in different times and 
places” (133). Furthermore, he continues, it is “historically and ethnographically emergent”, 
thus highlighting once more the changing nature of the democratic discourse, which assumes 
different meanings from different perspectives (134). Indeed, the constructivist approach 
helps examining democracy as a constructed concept which is fluid and shaped by the reality 
it is used in, but it fails to see how such discourse has been presented by  India to Nepal in his 
several transitional phases.  
To summarize, this section has illustrated how India’s intervention in the democratization of 
Nepal has been analyzed in the literature by referring to three systemic theories of 
international relations. Whilst liberal perspectives  have  showed India’s concerns with peace 
and the freedom of citizens, and realist points of view have complemented the analysis by 
looking at India’s own interests in a democratic Nepal, the constructivist approach has shed 
light on the constructed nature of democracy, arguing that the democratic discourse is fluid 
and heterogenous. Indeed, when combined, the three approaches provide a broad picture of 
India-Nepal relationship on the issue of democratization. However, they fail to see how the 
democratic discourse has been created and promoted by India in the different transitional 
phases. It is with the purpose to bridge this gap, that this thesis aims at introducing a post-
structuralist approach to the analysis of India’s intervention. In fact, as the next section will 
articulate, postructuralism, when applied to international relations, can contribute to 
examining democracy as a discourse constructed and spread through language, thus 
uncovering India’s own structural interests in a democratic Nepal. 
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Chapter III. Theoretical Framework:  
Democracy, Democracy Discourse, Hegemony, and Post-structuralism 
 
In political science, democracy is traditionally framed as a system of government with 
fixed structural characteristics aimed at empowering the citizens . Democracy emphasizes the 
collective participation of the citizens of a given state not only in choosing the government 
that better represents their interests, but also in checking its performance and, if necessary, in 
overthrowing it by means of free elections (Tilly 3). Citizens are invited to participate in the 
political arena  through the formation of political and apolitical organizations, the bulk of 
which is enclosed in the concept of civil society, a fundamental aspect of democratic rule (4). 
On the theoretical level, democracy embraces the principles of participation, representation, 
and protection of human rights, thus endorsing the  ideas of the French revolutionaries of the 
18th century, whose beliefs are stated  in the famous motto  “egalité, fraternité et liberté” 
(Cunningham 28-31). On the institutional level, democracy entails the installation of a series 
of institutions aimed both at guaranteeing the sovereignty of the people, and at allowing 
citizens to pursue their own interests in a free and competitive manner (Tilly 13-14). These 
democratic institutions usually include a multi-party parliamentary system to guarantee 
representation, a constitution emphasizing the importance of human rights and their 
protection, and a solid rule of law intended to provide stability and the flourishing of the 
individual (15-16). Indeed, at least in theory, the promise of maintaining and enhancing  such 
values explains why democracy is so appealing worldwide, and why it is reputed more 
representative of the people’s interests and needs. However, such system of rule is the 
embodiment of liberal principles which, put in Marxist terms, are the mere “superstructure” 
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of an  economic system allocating power  in the hands of a specific group, and as such it is 
meant to justify and make acceptable the power structure of a country (Newman 141). 
In the 1970s, with the cultural turn occurring in the social sciences, democracy and its claims 
came to assume a different shade of meaning in academia. A newly-formed strand of 
scholarly work starts analyzing the concept of democracy as a discourse, thus applying 
Foucault’s notions of power to the study of the liberal political system (Keane 7). Discourse, 
as explained by Foucault, entails an institutionalized way of thinking that simultaneously 
produces its subject. Therefore, the French scholar advocates the existence of an 
interrelationship between knowledge and power, where the latter shapes the former and 
naturalizes it by means of reiteration (Newman 141). In other words, related to the concept of 
intertextuality, discourse limits the creativity of writers and thinkers, as it creates the 
framework for everything that can be thought or said about a specific matter (143-144). By 
introducing the concept of discourse, Foucault points out  the capillarity of power, as it 
imperceptibly spreads through every institution representing the state both at the public and at 
the private level (144). Language becomes therefore one of the main tools adopted for the 
creation and perpetration of discourse, and language itself  becomes the primary object of 
analysis. In analyzing the democratic discourse, scholars focus on examining how ideas of 
democracy are created and presented, and the role role that language plays in concealing 
power structures in what would otherwise seem apolitical concepts (145-147) . In studying 
the discursive aspect of democracy, its ideological nature comes to light. Ideology, or “false 
consciousness” in Marx’s words,  is a system of beliefs and ideas used to motivate and 
naturalize  present political and economic situations, and  is created by a dominant group to 
support in a socially accepted way its domination over its subjects (Keane 6-7). When 
democracy is analyzed as an ideology, its hegemonic nature becomes evident. Hegemony, as 
elaborated  by Antonio Gramsci, is understandable as a form of dominance established 
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through a combination of force and consent (Riley 9). On this note, Giuseppe Vacca, one of 
the most famous interpreters of Gramsci’s writings, argues that there is “no hegemony 
without democracy”, as only through democratic ideals a dominant group meets the consent 
of its subjects, who possess the credulous belief of being the main actors in the political 
system (9-11). In international relations, hegemony comes to be understood in terms of soft 
power, explained by Nye as “getting the others to do what you want”. Unlike hard power, 
which emphasizes economic and military superiority, soft power aims at giving the illusion to 
the other of having freedom in deciding which actions to undertake, whilst concealing the 
domination embedded in such persuasiveness. In this sense, soft power comes to undermine 
the sovereignty of other countries in an imperceptible way, and tends to naturalize such 
imbalance by using linguistic as well as cultural tools (Keane 7).  
 But how can one understand, frame, and study the democracy discourse, its hegemonic 
practices, and its relation to power? This is where post-structuralism steps in. The post-
structural school of thought emerged in the 1970s from a combination of Foucault’s ideas of 
discourse, the linguistic theories of De Saussure, and Derrida’s theory of deconstruction 
(Easthope 14). Whilst Foucault’s theories contribute to an understanding of the association 
between power and text, De Saussure and Derrida’s linguistic theories allow for a more in-
depth linguistic analysis of the text. De Saussure’s  theories are at the basis of post-
structuralism as he portrays, in his analysis of linguistic signs, the difference between 
signifier and signified, where the former represents the form, and the latter its actual content 
(15). Derrida’s idea of “difference” further reinforces De Saussure’s distinction between 
signifier and signified, as he argues that the signified can be understood in terms of difference 
between the selection of a signifier rather than another (28-29). Derrida also brings forward 
the idea of linguistic deconstruction, where he argues that the text has to be fragmented in 
order to capture its real meaning which is “postponed” throughout its different components 
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(31) .In deconstructing discourses and understanding how language takes part in their 
production, post-structuralism takes a critical stand towards what is generally accepted and 
recognized as truth and knowledge. In other words, post-structuralism is critical of major 
narratives, and entails a linguistic and rhetorical analysis of texts to search for the 
relationships of power embedded in them (13). 
In international relations theory, post-structuralism can contribute to uncovering the power 
imbalance hidden in the adoption of political discourses and hegemonic narratives by a 
specific country (De Goede 60). By looking at language and its strategic use, post-structural 
theory can examine a country’s creation and consolidation of power, and, by differentiating 
between signifier and signified, can challenge its main narratives, and see how they conceal 
power structures (61-62). Furthermore, because post-structuralism, building on Marxist 
notions of historical materialism, studies the context in which discourses are created and 
perpetrated, it identifies discourses as fluid and shaped by specific political, historical, and 
economic circumstances, thus being able to trace their  evolution and transformation over 
time and space (Newman 148).   
To conclude, this section has set the foundations for understanding the theories adopted in 
this paper for analyzing India’s influence in the process of democratization of Nepal. By 
introducing post-structuralism and its belief in the construction and reproduction of power 
relationship through language, this chapter has shown the importance of examining the 
discursive nature of democracy, presented as a hegemonic narrative used to consolidate one 
state’s power over another  in the field of international relations. The next chapter will look 
into political discourse analysis, a necessary tool for a post-structural interpretation of India-
Nepal relationship. 
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Chapter IV. Methodology 
 
With the purpose of answering its research question, this paper will adopt the 
methodology of political discourse analysis, which will be applied to the study of primary 
sources. Political discourse analysis aims at uncovering reproduction of power, power abuse, 
and power imbalance in political texts, thus bringing together an understanding of concepts 
pertaining to the academic field of political science, and a post-structural analysis of language 
and rhetorics. (Van Dijk 253).  By political texts, it is meant every source produced by 
political actors, referring therefore to political speeches as well as treaties and agreements. 
Furthermore, political messages can be found also in other forms of text which aim at 
creating a particular discourse over a subject, such as media (260). It is for this reason, that 
this thesis aims at studying the language of both political speeches and media coverage by 
India  over the issue of democratization of Nepal. Through a qualitative analysis of such 
primary sources, combined with the study of secondary sources where necessary to 
corroborate arguments pertaining to the creation, consolidation, and perpetration of 
democratic discourse in the context of India’s foreign policy, this thesis will answer its 
research question.  The selection of the primary sources that will be analyzed is based on a 
series of set criteria,namely: such texts come from India; they are written in english; and they 
cover the process of democratization in Nepal. By breaking up the general discourse on 
democracy in Nepal into the three transitional phases illustrated in the historical background, 
this paper will present the creation, adoption, and transformation of the democracy discourse 
in three distinct periods , attempting to see how and why its form is shaped by the context of 
its creation and utilization. The set of questions that the application of political discourse 
analysis to this paper can help answering include: what is democratic discourse? How was it 
created? By whom? For which purpose? 
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Chapter V. Democracy and Peace: 
Nepal’s First Democratic Transition (1951-1959) 
 
By 1950, Nepal presented a substantial base for the establishment of democracy. The 
Rana dynasty was at a tipping point, whilst the democratic forces, embodied in the figure of 
the King, the Nepali Congress, and their network of alliances, had become more popular both 
at home and abroad (Kantha 62). In fact, the Ranas enjoyed the support of only a very 
restricted strand of the population, since their establishment of a feudal system, the dismissal 
of royal power, and their adoption of an isolationist policy had not catered to the necessities 
of the Nepali population, plagued by poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment (Hachhethu 
132). On the contrary, the democratic faction had strengthened in Nepal, and the NC led a 
three-month armed revolution which virtually put the Ranas on their knees. Furthermore, 
democratic ideals started to penetrate in the Himalayan state, as the Nepali civil society 
looked with admiration at India’s democratic achievements occurring in the country since its 
gained independence (132-133).  In this transitional phase, India’s contribution was centered 
around a further consolidation of the NC’s achievements, consolidation attained through a 
diplomatic mediation that led to the  stipulation of the Delhi Agreement, which paved the 
way for the beginning of Nepal’s first democratic transition (Destradi 294).  
 India’s foreign policy in this phase, which was dominated by PM Nehru’s ideas of “peaceful 
coexistence”, revolved around the five cardinal principles expressed in the Panchsheel, which 
advocated non-interference in other countries’ affairs and stressed the need for a peaceful 
neighborhood which would allow India to focus on its own domestic problems (Ganguly et al 
5-6). Indeed, at this point, democracy promotion was nowhere near the top of India’s foreign 
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policy agenda, which was concerned with a series of internal problems, such as 
underdevelopment and the Telangana uprising. Nevertheless, New Delhi decided to mediate  
Nepal’s democratization (Destradi 288). As it will be argued in this section, India’s decision 
to take part in the democratization process of its neighbor represents a political maneuver 
aimed at achieving India’s goals in the international arena. In other words, New Delhi 
believed that a democratic Nepal would be conducive to the achievement of India’s own 
interests in its foreign policy domain. Consequently, with the purpose of supporting such 
statement, this chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will illustrate how the 
democratic discourse was created and presented in the years 1950-1959, and will consist of 
an analysis of the language adopted by Nehru in his political messages to Nepali high 
officials which were written with the purpose of fostering the democratic transition in Nepal. 
The second part will look at how the discourse reflects India’s foreign policy, and how it 
conceals India’s interests in this decade. 
In the months preceding the demise of the Rana regime, Nehru presented democracy as a 
solution to political instability and civil unrest, and, in several political letters addressed to 
Nepali officials, advocated the need for “a peaceful compromise” that would help Nepal 
“progressing” ( Gopal Volume 15  338) . In his conversation held with King Tribhuvan in 
New Delhi after his escape to India, Nehru argued that democracy would entail “stability and 
prosperity” and argued that “[the Rana government] is not in a position to function as a stable 
government” and that “other troubles will continue occurring” ( 343). Likewise, in the same 
year,  in a letter addressed to the leader of the Nepali Congress, B.P. Koirala, the Indian PM 
stated the necessity of “bringing peace to Nepal”, and argued that “democracy would 
contribute to put an end to conflict and inequality” (351) 
When, in January 1951, the Delhi Agreement set the foundation for the formation of an 
interim government and of a constituent assembly, PM Nehru sent a congratulatory message 
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to the people of Nepal, expressing his excitement over the decision “of formulating a new 
constitution that would be more representative of the people of Nepal”, and shared its hope 
that “all past attempts to violent changes will cease and efforts will be directed towards 
peaceful cooperation and progress” (Gopal Volume 19 212). In the same way, he did not fail 
to congratulate B.P. Koirala after his party won the first general elections in 1959, stating that 
“one further step towards the achievement of peace has been taken today” and that “India 
cheerishees these political developments” (Gopal Volume 32 417). In another letter sent to 
King Mahendra a few months later, Nehru stated to be  “ deeply interested in the progress of 
Nepal, and India hopes that stable and progressive conditions will be progressively 
established there, as it is in the best interest of Nepal and India to create a peaceful border” 
(418-420). When King Mahendra staged a coup in 1960, Nehru wrote several letters to the 
dismissed PM Koirala, expressing his concerns over “ what this would mean for India” and 
how the  coup could “threaten the peaceful coexistence in the region” (Gopal Volume 45 
171). Furthermore, as he wrote in a private message to India’s ambassador in Kathmandu, he 
feared that the coup “would cause Nepal to drift away from India”, and to get closer to other 
“authoritarian leaders” in the region (Gopal Volume 46 283).  
Indeed, the most recurring words in the democratic discourse are the ones of peace, stability, 
progress, and prosperity. Interestingly enough, these words reflect the five cardinal principles 
expressed in the Panchsheel, the document shaping India’s foreign policy from its 
independence until 1962, and these are:  respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference; equality and cooperation for 
mutual benefits; and peaceful co-existence (Ganguly et al 6). Therefore, the association of the 
democratic discourse with such words represents India’s own interests in this specific phase 
of its foreign policy.  
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The creation of a peaceful environment, as well as maintaining stability in the region, were 
the two main goals of India’s foreign policy in this period, as New Delhi believed that peace 
would be conducive to its own internal development. In fact, in this phase, the government of 
India dedicated much of its internal funds to development spending, thus virtually neglecting 
its defence sector (Schaffer et al 43) . As the theory of ‘democratic peace’ explains, a 
democratic Nepal would have decreased the risk of war, as “democracies never go at war 
with each other”, and would have allowed India to keep focusing on its internal 
problems(Destradi 291). Furthermore, democracy in Nepal would have contributed to the 
attainment of another principle of the Panchsheel, the one of non-aggression. In fact, India 
wanted to make sure to have another solid ally in his neighborhood that would help it contain 
the Pakistani threat, which since independence had been undermining India’s sovereignty and 
stability in the northern state of Kashmir (Destradi 292). Furthemore, peace and stability in 
Nepal would have prevented another India’s nightmare to come true: the involvement of the 
URSS and the US in the region. In fact, with the Cold War unfolding, Nehru was extremely 
concerned that an unstable Nepal could become theatre of another indirect conflict between 
the two superpowers, thus undermining India’s dominance in South Asia, and threatening its 
newly-achieved independence (Schaffer et al 53).  Hence, the desire for democracy in Nepal 
can also be interpreted as a corollary of India’s non-alignment stance in international 
relations, which was driven by the desire of stemming the cold war and the risks it presented 
to the independence, freedom, and sovereignty of the countries of the global south. Finally, 
the demise of the Rana autocracy would have facilitated the achievement of the last principle 
of the Panchsheel, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit. In fact, since the 
establishment of an open border which envisaged a free flow of citizens and goods between 
the two countries, PM Nehru believed that a democratic Nepal would maximize the 
efficiency of such institution, and that would do so by guaranteeing the  continuity of the 
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flow of goods and services, while simultaneously ensuring the safety of the citizens (Destradi 
295-296).  
The fact that India looked at Nepal as the most fundamental neighbor in the region for the 
achievement of peace and stability in South Asia is corroborated by the signing of  the Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship between  the two countries in 1950. The language here is not very 
different from the one adopted by PM Nehru in the political messages aforementioned. In this 
treaty, India emphasized the importance that a good and peaceful relationship with Nepal 
could imply for the two countries, and stressed the cultural affinities as well as the historical 
ties between the two states that should motivate their cooperation in the present (Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship). India presents itself as Nepal’s strongest ally which could help it 
achieve development and prosperity, whilst asking in return that the Himalayan state would 
be sensitive to it security issues and to the attainment of peace in the region (ibidem). Once 
more, India’s interests expressed in the Panchsheel emerge out of this document: cooperation, 
peace, and stability. Here, democracy is not mentioned, as it was first signed with the Rana 
rulers, but it is interesting to see how India’s expectations from the Ranas Nepal are the same 
that New Delhi hoped to secure through the establishment of democracy in the country 
(Nayak 581). Therefore, it could be argued, that India saw a democratic Nepal as more likely 
to be conducive to the achievement of its own interests, hence the creation of the democracy 
discourse. 
To conclude, this section has provided a general picture of the democratic discourse adopted 
by India during the first democratic transition of Nepal. Democracy has come to be 
associated with the main principles of India’s Panchsheel, thus entailing ideas of peace, 
stability and prosperity. In fact, the analysis of the discourse created through Nehru’s political 
messages to Nepali officials to boost a democratic transition in the country, reflects India’s 
own interests in this specific phase of its foreign policy, whose main concerns revolve around 
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the creation of a peaceful environment for the attainment of its internal development, and the 
consolidation of stability in the region which would prevent South Asia to become involved 
in the dangerous dynamics of the cold war. If, one the one hand, a post-structural 
interpretation of India’s intervention corroborates the liberal perspective, which sees India 
emphasizing cooperation for peace; on the other hand, it challenges it, as the analysis of 
language brought to light the concealment of India’s own structural interests over a 
democratic Nepal.  The next section will look into how the discourse has changed during the 
second transitional phase of Nepal, and how this evolution reflects a change of priorities in 
India’s foreign policy.   
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Chapter VI. Democracy and Security:  
Nepal’s Second Transition (1990-1991) 
 
By the time of the second democratic transition, a lot of things had changed both in 
Nepal, and in India’s approach towards it. In Nepal, if, on the one hand, the establishment of 
the Panchayat regime had caused a further centralization of power in the hands of the King; 
on the other hand, it contributed to the erosion of the popular support for the monarchy, as a 
series of failed economic reforms brought about the occurrence of an economic crisis 
characterized by high inflation and skyrocketing unemployment rate (Hachhethu et al 135-
137).  Meanwhile, the Nepali Congress managed to form an alliance with the United Left 
Alliance, which agreed to cooperate with the NC to bring down absolute monarchy in the 
country. The newly-sealed cooperation succeeded in gaining more popular support, 
particularly amongst the urban middle class, which was severely affected by the unfolding of 
the crisis.This collaboration resulted in the first mass movement for restoration of democracy 
in Kathmandu, Jan Andolan I, which pushed King Birendra to put an end to the Panchayat 
regime, and to re-establish the multiparty parliament(Hachhethu et al 137; Kantha 64) . 
Indeed, whilst the joint effort of anti-royal  forces was quintessential in restoring democracy 
in Nepal, the final straw was the imposition of an economic blockade by India in 1989. In 
fact, as King Birendra decided to buy weapons from China in an attempt to strengthen their 
bilateral ties, India decided not to renovate the Transit Treaty with Nepal, thus leaving its 
neighbor in the grip of a deepening economic crisis which increased the popular discontent 
towards the Panchayat regime and its policies, and eventually led to the civil uprising 
(Hacheethu et al 137).   
  
 
Musacchio 32 
The imposition of an economic blockade perfectly shows the shift in India’s foreign policy in 
the period following the Sino-Indian conflict and the death of PM Nehru. In fact, in the phase 
spanning from Indira Gandhi’s election in 1966 to  the economic liberalization occurring at  
the end of 1991, New Delhi pursued a more assertive approach to  its foreign policy, which 
came to be labelled ‘Indira Doctrine’ (Wagner 9). The embracement of this doctrine marked 
the passage from Nehru’s liberal ideas and its faith in non-alignment to a more structural 
approach to foreign policy, characterized by the adoption of hard power for the achievement 
of India’s own interests, particularly so in its backyard (9-10). Whilst ‘The Indira Doctrine’ 
envisaged the principles of non-intervention and security enhancement, such approach to 
foreign policy was accompanied, in the context of Nepal, by the adoption of the ‘ Twin Pillar 
Policy’ , which dominated the Indo-Nepal relationship for roughly 30 years (Mazumdar et al 
93).  This policy entailed a simultaneous support both for monarchy and democracy in Nepal, 
and was devised with the purpose of restoring the special relationship with its neighbour  that 
had cooled since India’s excessive interference in the first democratic transition and the 
King’s consequent decision to forge closer ties with China(93-94). In fact, by means of not 
taking a too radical stance towards neither the King nor the party, the Twin Pillar policy 
aimed at gradually bringing Nepal back into India’s sphere of influence, and such approach  
was deemed ideal to deal with the continuous interplay of royal and democratic forces in the 
political arena of the Himalayan state.  
 By providing an analysis of a series of articles written in the years 1989-1991 and published 
in India Today and the Indian Express, this section aims at showing how the democracy 
discourse evolved during the second democratic transition of Nepal, and how such evolution -
expressed through language- is reflective of India’s changing approach and  objectives in the 
international arena. Because the adoption of the discourse mirrors the duality of India’s 
foreign policy stance towards Nepal, this chapter will argue that such discourse in this phase 
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is composed of two aspects. On the one hand, it embodies the ideas of the Twin Pillar policy 
and provides a moderate narrative of the democratic transition of Nepal which includes the 
figure of the King in the process; on the other hand, it epitomizes the principles of the Indira 
Doctrine, and therefore stresses India’s objective of security enhancement and its attempt of 
stemming the influence of external powers in South Asia.   
  
The first aspect of the discourse portrayed by Indian media in this period creates an idea of 
democracy which sees the figure and role of the King as a necessary component for its 
consolidation, and emphasizes the importance of cooperation between King Birendra and the 
democratic parties for the attainment of long-lasting stability and security. In an article 
written for the Indian Express in 1990, when the movement for restoration of democracy 
pushed the King to abolish the Panchayat system, Suri wrote that “democracy guarantees  
peace, stability, and security” and added that this could not be obtained without “the full 
cooperation of his Majesty [the King]” (“Security Pact”).  Likewise, in another article written 
for India Today, Uttam Sengupta praised the achievements of the democratic parties stating 
that “ the winds of democracy have won a dramatic victory in Nepal [...] but it remains to be 
seen whether King Birendra can ensure its survival” (“King Birendra Gives in to Demands”). 
Even in another article published  in India Today after the free elections of 1991 and 
including an interview with the newly-elected PM K.P. Bhattarai, the role of the King is 
described as “fundamental”, and is stated that “ the King is fully cooperative” and that such 
cooperation is necessary “to create a safe environment” particularly so in rural areas, where 
“it will take time to understand democracy” (“The King is Cooperative”). The language 
adopted in this first aspect of the discourse perfectly reflects India’s behaviour towards Nepal 
since the endorsement of  the ‘Twin Pillar Policy’. The selection of references to the articles 
illustrates how, in this phase, India hesitated to take an assertive stance towards the 
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democratization of Nepal, and rather  created  a discourse that included both the King and the 
parties in the attainment of democracy, in the hope not to alienate the King and not to further 
push him towards China. India’s moderate stance towards the second democratic transition of  
the Himalayan state has to be understood in terms of a lesson that New Delhi learnt from its 
excessive interference in the first democratic process of Nepal, which drove the royal elite 
into the arms of China.(Dabhade et al 162).  In fact, the strengthening of the Sino-Nepal 
bilateral relationship in the 1960s ended up increasing New Delhi’s concern over China’s 
growing influence in South Asia, and led India to pursue a less radical approach towards the 
King, in the hope to tame his anti-India political maneuvers (162-163).  The lack of an 
assertive stance towards the King was evident when, at everyone’s surprise, India was one of 
the few countries not to have condemned the Palace’s decision to use violence to suppress the 
civil protests preceding Jan Andolan I (Hacheethu et al 138). In fact, Because New Delhi 
aimed at restoring its special relationship with its neighbour, it wanted to guarantee its loyalty 
regardless of which form of government was ruling it (Mazumdar et al 92).Therefore, the 
adoption of a democracy discourse which does not harshly criticize the King, but rather 
includes him in the process of democratization, whilst simultaneously praising the parties and 
their achievements, is a reflection of India’s twin pillar policy towards Nepal, aimed at 
securing itself an ally and simultaneously containing the Chinese threat without recurring to 
hard power.  
 Nevertheless, this aspect of the discourse must be read  in the bigger framework of India’s 
Indira Doctrine, which aimed  at regional domination, and therefore coexists with a second 
aspect which emphasizes India’s principal concern in this phase: security.  
In the aforementioned article written by  Uttam Sengupta  for India Today , in which the 
unfolding on the civil uprising is described, the author stated that “democracy will provide a 
soothing promise of security” but added that “ excitement is mixed with anxiety over an 
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uncertain future” (“King Birendra Gives in to Demands”). In the other article by Suri for the 
Indian Express, the journalist even advocated “the necessity of a security pact” between the 
two countries, which “democracy [in Nepal] is more likely to secure” (“Security Pact”). Ideas 
of security are also prominent in Ramindar Singh article for India Today covering the 
imposition of the economic blockade in 1989. The economic blockade was here described “as 
a necessary response to a security threat, [...] as Nepal continuously played the China card”. 
Singh also pointed out how Nepal’s decision to strengthen its relationship with China has 
caused India to “stand at attention”, and that “if Nepal does not want to maintain goodwill 
and trust, then it will be treated as any other country” (“Barricades Go up”). Security 
concerns are also expressed in Menon Ramesh article explaining the political situation of 
Nepal on the eve of the first general elections of 1991. In fact, he wrote, “ 40 parties are 
jostling on the political stage” and went on stating that some of them, mostly referring to the 
CPN (UML), “have a clear anti-India and pro-China agenda” and that their victory would 
entail “further security threats” for New Delhi (“Date with Destiny”).   
This second aspect of the discourse tends to associate democracy with security, and is 
therefore a reflection of the Indira Doctrine and its prioritization of maintaining and 
enhancing security not only in India, but also in its area of influence (Wagner 9). The shift in 
India’s foreign policy was the result of the 1962 disastrous defeat at the hands of China, 
which brought about a major change in New Delhi’s vision of the world order, where Nehru’s 
liberal approach was not sufficient anymore for the achievement of India’s changed 
objectives in this period: the consolidation of its dominant position in South Asia, with the 
consequent  marginalization of  external competitors, and the enhancement of security vis-a-
vis perceived threats  (Ganguly et al 8). Therefore, this aspect of the discourse did not only 
allow India to achieve its interests, but it also created a pretext for India’s adoption of hard 
power  in circumstances where threats to security were perceived, thus motivating the 
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imposition of the economic blockade (8-9). Furthermore, a discourse presenting democracy 
as a security measure, creates a binary opposition between democracy and authoritarianism, 
where the former is embodied by India  and the latter by China. (Mazumdar et al 93).  
To conclude, this section has shown how, in the second democratic transition of Nepal, New 
Delhi adopted a democracy discourse which mirrors its double stance to foreign policy, both 
towards Nepal, and towards the international order. For one thing, such discourse presents a 
form of democracy that entailed the cooperation of the King and the parties, thus resulting in 
the support for constitutional monarchy. For another thing, it stressed ideas of security, 
particularly vis-a-vis China and its expansionist policy endorsed since the 1960s, and 
provided India with a framework for intervention in perceived cases of threats. Consequently, 
discourse analysis of media coverage has corroborated realist interpretations of India’s 
intervention in this democratic phase, as it has been proven that India’s actions have been 
influenced by its structural interests. Nevertheless, the post-structural approach has shown 
how in this phase India did not only recur to hard power, but also to soft power, whose 
adoption is embodied in the endorsement of the democracy discourse.   
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Chapter VII. Democracy and Development:  
Nepal’s Third Democratic Transition (2005-2008) 
 
In 2006, the protest carried on by millions of Nepalis overcrowding the cities, and 
demanding the dismissal  of the King, marked the beginning of the third and final democratic 
transition of Nepal, which officially culminated in 2008, with the proclamation of the 
republic (Kantha 66-67) . Jan Andolan II was the result of the India-mediated cooperation 
between the Maoist insurgents and the Seven Party Alliance, whose lack of agreement in the 
previous decade caused the emergence of a civil war which tormented the country for 10 
years (Hacheethu et al 137). In fact, in 1996, dissatisfied with the new democratic 
establishment and its inability to address the problems of inequality and corruption afflicting 
Nepal, the Maoist forces launched a war against the state , that was aimed at the 
establishment of the People’s Republic and concretized in a series of attacks targeting the 
state’s institutions all over the country. It was with the stated goal of putting an end to the 
civil war, that, in 2005, King Gyanendra declared the state of emergency and staged a royal 
coup which halted once more the democratic progression of Nepal (138).  However, this 
time, the political developments of the Himalayan state had attracted the attention of several 
international actors which, concerned with the threat that the civil war posed to the whole 
security of South Asia, and preoccupied with the appalling level of underdevelopment and 
human rights protection in the country, assumed a more radical stance towards the King, and 
frowned upon its coup, pushing for the re-establishment of a multi-party democracy. The 
emergence of the civil conflict awoken the interest not only of the UN, but also of the United 
States, which in the 2000s was extremely concerned with the growing threat that terrorism 
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presented to the world order, and consequently became more involved in the political 
developments of the country ( Destradi 287). India itself, which since the mid-1990s had 
entered another phase of its foreign policy, openly criticized the royal coup, and directly 
intervened in contentious politics of Nepal (288). In fact, not only did New Delhi stop the 
flow of military aid sent to its neighbor to tackle the Maoist insurgents, but also intervened in 
the stipulation of a treaty which sealed the cooperation of Maoists and parties for the 
overthrow of the King, the 12 point Agreement, and brokered a peace deal that, in 2006, led 
to Jan Andolan II (Hacheethu et al 138). 
New Delhi’s open support for democracy in this phase does not have to be understood in 
terms of a change in its attitude towards democracy promotion in Asia, but rather as a radical 
change in its foreign policy which occurred since the mid-1990s (Ganguly et al 13-14). In 
fact, following the series of reforms envisaged and implemented by Manmohan Singh, 
India’s Finance Minister, at the end of 1991, India liberalized its economy, and initiated a 
series of projects aimed at increasing its economic and political cooperation with the rest of 
the world, particularly with the United States(14). In the foreign policy realm, the 
liberalization of the economy brought about the endorsement of the Gujral doctrine, which 
entailed the principle of “non-reciprocity”, meaning  that India not only had a bigger 
responsibility towards the smaller countries in South Asia, but also that it should assist them 
by “giving more than it would receive” (Wagner 12). The promised assistance to India’s 
neighboring countries concretized in the creation of a series of developmental projects, which 
transformed New Delhi into “the biggest donor of South Asia” (13).  But how was this 
change in India’s foreign policy reflected in its adoption of a democracy discourse? The 
purpose of this section is, by providing an analysis of relevant political speeches as well as 
newspapers articles, to frame the democracy discourse adopted by India in the final 
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transitional phase of Nepal, and to show how it is used to conceal New Delhi’s changed 
interests both in Nepal and in the international arena.  
In September 2008, in his famous speech given in Kathmandu in front of the members of the 
newly-formed government of Nepal, the Indian foreign minister  Pranab Mukherjee praised 
the establishment of the republic, and stated that  “the democratic transition in Nepal has 
passed several key milestone” and added that “ against all odds [...] the ongoing transition has 
come a long way” (Mukherjee) . He also went on stating the new priority of India-Nepal 
relationship: development. “It is important to note here that lasting democracy and true 
development are intrinsically interlinked [...] as one cannot exist without the other”, and 
concluded “ Nepal’s political stability and economic growth are in India’s best interest, [...] 
and i am convinced that the peace process will entail stability and development for Nepal” 
(“Partners in Democracy and Development” ). Indeed, Mukherjee was not the only one in this 
period to stress the link between democracy and development, and such association became 
the milestone of the democracy discourse adopted in this phase. In another political speech 
given in the same year by Nitish Kumar covering the restored special relationship between 
India and Nepal, the chief minister of Bihar, after summarizing the cultural and historical ties 
that the two countries share, stated: “ as a close friend and neighbour [...], India remains 
committed to supporting the people of Nepal in their pursuit of achieving economic growth 
and development”, and concluded by inferring that “development can be the solution to many 
problems, [...] from civil unrest to endemic poverty” (“Emerging Trends in India-Nepal 
Relationship”). The interrelationship between democracy and development was also 
corroborated by the Indian media. T.V. Rajeswar, in an article published in The Tribune in 
2002, after the King’s dismissal of the newly elected PM Deuba, described the civil war and 
the effects that it had on Nepal, and stated that  “the Maoist insurgency is a threat that will not 
end by merely resolving the constitutional crisis” and concluded by saying that 
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underdevelopment is behind the civil war and that “only a series of well-targeted 
developmental plans can obviate [the issue]” (“Constitutional Crisis in Nepal”). Likewise, 
another article published in The Hindu, harshly criticized the royal coup of 2005, defining it 
as “authoritarian and dangerous” and denounced the several infractions committed by the 
King in his ascent to power, ranging from “disrespect for human rights” to “lack of interest in 
the development of its people” (“King dismisses Government”). The newly-adopted 
discourse also left room for the agency of other states, and particularly sealed the beginning 
of the cooperation between India and the United States. In a set of articles published in The 
Times of India between 2005 and 2006, the authors stressed the newly-forged alliance of 
India and the US and inferred that “The US and India share the common goal of restoring 
democracy in Nepal and curbing the Maoist insurgency”, and that “the US urged the King to 
move quickly” to restore democracy (“US Rejects King”). Likewise, in another article 
including several interviews with American officials, The Times of India emphasized the role 
that New Delhi could play in the attainment of development in the region, and, quoting David 
Camp, a senior US official, wrote “India [in Nepal] plays an absolutely critical role [...] the 
US is far away,  India is right next door , [...] and it has most to lose if things go wrong” (“US 
India to Restore Peace”).  
As the quotes point out, in this phase India adopted a democracy discourse which entailed 
ideas of development. Arguably, the construction and adoption of such discourse is not only 
reflective of India’s changed stance in its foreign policy, but it also contributed to the 
achievement of India’s structural interests in this phase, such as strengthening its bilateral 
relationship with the US, stemming the Maoist insurgency from spreading to its territory, and 
providing stability for the implementation of projects aimed at securing its economic growth.  
By presenting democracy through a discourse entailing development, New Delhi managed to 
corroborate its hegemony over Nepal by means of soft power. In fact, if, in the past, the series 
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of episodes involving India’s direct intervention and use of  hard power had provided the 
component of force to the formation of hegemony, the promise of development aimed at 
enhancing the welfare of the people have  complemented it with consensus (Riley 9). By 
promising the double package of democracy-development, India has followed in this decade 
the path of the US, and created a discourse that portrays it as the bening superpower, with the 
skills and will to enhance the development of the region (Wagner 12). The creation of a 
hegemonic discourse by means of soft power is indeed reflective of the Gujral doctrine 
where, by proposing itself as bringer of development and peace, India attempts to validate its 
increasing intervention in the domestic affairs of its neighbors (13). The adoption of this 
discourse also consolidated the newly-formed relationship with the US. India presented itself 
as a valid ally of America in its fight against terrorism and authoritarianism, and it did so in 
the hope to obtain a bigger share of power in the international arena. In fact, because in this 
phase New Delhi aimed at becoming more influential in the international high table, it 
believed that a closer cooperation with the US would help it achieve its goal. India’s 
involvement -starting from the 2000s-  in several multilateral international initiatives for 
democracy and development promoted by the United States has to be understood under this 
light (Destradi 287).  
Furthermore, by intervening in the democratization of Nepal with the stated goal of 
enhancing its development, India also addressed the Maoist insurgency. New Delhi justified 
the rise of such allegedly terrorist groups as a consequence of underdevelopment, and 
therefore proposed development as a solution to their problems ( Bansh Jha 51). Arguably, 
India was not really concerned with the Maoist threat in Nepal as much as it was about the 
links it had with the Naxalite groups operating within its borders. In fact, the 2000s saw the 
emergence of naxalite groups all over the country, and particularly in the northeast, which, by 
ideology and stated goals, presented affinities and links with the Nepali Maoists (Chitralekha 
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42).  Consequently, by mediating the peace deal between Maoists and the Nepali parties 
through a democracy discourse entailing development, India also hoped to contain the 
domestic threat that had been challenging ts sovereignty in its peripheral regions (Chitralekha 
42-43; Hachheetu et al 138). 
In addition, the adoption of such discourse also allowed India to increase its economic 
influence in Nepal. By promoting development and providing funds aimed at enhancing 
economic growth, India hoped to create a stable and peaceful environment in Nepal which 
would be able to increase India’s economic influence in it, and which would have enhanced 
India’s own economic advantages according to the economic theory of comparative 
advantage (Wagner 16-17). Besides, Nepal’s position was crucial for the consolidation of 
India’s trade with its eastern neighbors, as most of its goods and services passed through the 
Himalayan state’s transit areas, and a series of violent episodes in the past had hindered their 
smooth passage, and affected negatively India’s trade (17-18). 
To conclude, a post-structural approach to the study of India’s intervention in Nepal’s final 
democratic transition has shown how the democracy discourse adopted by New Delhi has 
changed in this phase, and how such changes are reflective of India’s new approach to its 
foreign policy, characterized by the Gujral doctrine. Discourse analysis has illustrated how 
the creation of a democracy discourse which entails ideas of development has been used by 
India to conceal the achievement of its structural interests, such as the corroboration of its 
alliance with the US, the containment of the Maoist threat, and the consolidation of its 
economic ties with Nepal and Asia. Such approach has shown that, although India still did 
not endorse a democracy promotion agenda, it supported a democratic installment in the 
country as believed to be conducive to the achievement of its goals, thus corroborating once 
more the realist interpretation of India’s intervention in Nepal.  
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Conclusion 
 
To conclude, through political discourse analysis, this  paper has provided a post-
structural interpretation of India’s intervention in the democratic transition of Nepal. By 
analyzing a set of primary sources, ranging from political speeches to media coverage, this 
thesis has demonstrated how, in spite of not possessing a clear democracy promotion agenda, 
India has encouraged the  democratization of its neighbor  through a discourse which, being 
historically contingent, changed over time to reflect India’s different approaches to its foreign 
policy and to conceal its structural interests in a democratic Nepal. The findings are 
summarized in the table below.  
 
 
 
 
As the table illustrates, the first democratic transition of Nepal spanned through the years 
1951-1959, and saw the King, the Nepali Congress, and India cooperating for overthrowing 
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the Rana regime and establishing a democratic government. In this transitional phase, as this 
paper has shown through an analysis of PM Nehru’s political messages to Nepali high 
officials, India has, through language,  created a discourse which associates democracy with 
peace. The adoption of such discourse, it has been argued, is not only reflective of India’s 
foreign policy in this phase, which was dictated by the 5 principles of the Panchsheel, but 
also conceals India’s structural interests in a democratic Nepal. Firstly, as the theory of 
democratic peace explains, a democratic Nepal would have contributed to the  creation of a 
peaceful environment in South Asia, which would have in turn  allowed India to focus on its 
own development; secondly, democracy in the Himalayan state would have prevented the 
country from becoming involved in the dynamics of the Cold War, which could have 
challenged India’s domination in the region and threatened its newly-achieved independence.  
In the second democratic phase of Nepal (1990-1991), which sees the NC working together 
with the left parties and the urban section of the population to put an end to the 
authoritarianism of the Panchayat system, India’s intervention has been more marginal. 
Nevertheless, this thesis has shown how, although not directly intervening in the 
democratization process, India has fostered democracy through a discourse which, mostly 
created through newspapers,  emphasized security and was, in turn, reflective of India’s 
changed stance to foreign policy, at this time characterized by the Indira Doctrine and the 
Twin Pillar policy. In fact, by associating democracy to security, New Delhi has been able to 
achieve its goals in the international arena, this time revolving around its  attempt to contain 
the Chinese threat and its growing influence in Nepal and South Asia. In this phase, this 
aspect of the discourse has been juxtaposed to  another one, which aimed at including the 
King in the democratization process, as an attempt to tame its recents political maneuvers 
which leaned towards China and drifted away from India.  
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 In the final transition, occurred between the years 2005 -2008, and bringing about the 
permanent demise of the Shah dynasty and the establishment of the republic, the analysis of a 
set of political speeches and newspapers articles has shown that the democracy discourse 
changed again. This time, shaped by the Gujral doctrine and its principle of non-reciprocity, 
India has promoted democracy through development jargon, and has done so in the attempt to 
consolidate its hegemony over the Himalayan state. By associating democracy to 
development, in this phase India has not only managed to strengthen its grip on Nepal, now 
completely dependent on India for developmental funds, but has also corroborated its newly-
formed relationship with the United States. Besides, the association of development and 
democracy has allowed India to tackle the Maoist insurgency, spreading through its borders 
and forging closer ties with Indian Naxalite groups, whilst simultaneously providing the 
foundations for  a stable environment which would allow India to increase its trade with the 
rest of East Asia, for which Nepal was seen as a getaway.  
Arguably, the contributions of this thesis are manifold. By building up on the existing 
literature covering India’s influence in Nepal, and combining it with the insights provided by 
post-structuralism, this thesis has not only corroborated realist interpretations of India’s 
intervention, but has also shed light on the capillarity of power, pointing out how language 
became a major tool adopted by India for the achievement of its own interests in Nepal.  If, 
on the one hand, this paper has paved the way for further studies of India’s construction of 
hegemony through language; on the other hand, it presents a major shortcoming. In fact, one 
of the main deficiencies of discourse analysis  is its inability to illustrate the way a discourse 
is perceived by the audience it is targeted for. In other words, what this paper fails to provide 
is an understanding of how the democracy discourse created by India was perceived by 
Nepal, and to what extent it affected its transition and political developments. The Himalayan 
state has in fact been analyzed throughout this paper as a mere passive receiver of the 
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discourse, and little attention has been paid to its agency throughout the democratic process, 
and to its response to India’s constant interventions in its affairs. This shortcoming could be 
easily obviated through an analysis of the Nepali perceptions on India’s role throughout its 
democratization, obtainable either through interviews or through an analysis of the discourse 
created by Nepali political texts on India’s intervention. Furthermore, future researchers 
could corroborate the argument of this thesis by analyzing it from different angles. For 
example, one could look at differences between English and Hindi sources, to see to what 
extent the language adopted influences the discourse. Likewise, this study of India’s 
intervention in Nepal could be strengthened by comparing it to an analysis of New Delhi’s 
intervention in the democratic transition of other countries in South Asia –such as Myanmar 
and Pakistan- with the purpose of uncovering general patterns and trends in the adoption of 
language for the creation of hegemony.  
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